dechamplain - the material soul

Je viens de terminer ma disseration finale pour le séminaire de philosophie et histoire des sciences. Voici le résumé, juste pour vous titiller:

 Cet article analyse la controverse Leibniz-Stahl concernant l’organisme et la relation âme-corps. Après avoir mis la controverse en contexte, je traiterai de l’étymologie du terme organisme de même que sa signification pour Leibniz et Stahl, m’appuyant alors sur les travaux de Cheung (2006). Je présenterai ensuite quelques points, réels ou présumés, d’accord et de désaccord entre les deux auteurs, avant d’opposer leurs principaux arguments dans le débat de manière à approfondir l’analyse. Tout au long du texte, des notions contemporaines sont évoquées et mises en parallèle avec les thèses de Leibniz et Stahl, dont j’aborderai l’actualité en conclusion.

J’inclus la totale en fichier attaché, pour ceux dont j’ai piqué la curiosité. La controverse Leibniz-Stahl.

Last night, someone dared me to name onephilosopher that wrote about being and time before Heidegger. It was, actually, a pretty easy question. I’m currently doing a seminar on Leibniz and we often talked about that exact subject. Time and being was, in fact, a pretty popular subject during the modern era.

Leibniz postulates a world composed of monads (even God is a monad). Time does not exist for Leibniz, it is a cognitive illusion produced when we consider the succession of phenomena. Same thing for space: it does a concept produced by analysing how objects are related to one another. So: relative time and space. A very interesting theory that’s opposed to the Newtonian model… just like Einstein’s, that uses relative time-space as well.

Leibniz pulled off a fascinating, coherent, brilliant and productive theory of being and time. On the other corner of the ring, mister H’s Time and Being is surely interesting, but, heck, it’s still po-mo rant.

Centuries before Antonio Damasio’s Descartes’ Error*, there was Leibniz, who also criticized Descartes’ conception of the body-soul relation, that we could summarize as:

1. The soul is an immaterial and immortal entity that “controls” the body;
2. The brain is the receptacle for the soul, more like an receiver than a computer;
3. The body is a fancy mechanism that transmits perceptions to and follow the orders of the soul.
4. The interface between body and soul is the pineal gland.

Except for point number 4, this conception corresponds to a popular folk-psychology view: the soul is a disembodied self, the body is a soulless vehicle. (While we’re on the topic: Mario and Denyse. Enough said.)

Leibniz himself had a pretty strange theory of the body-soul: there is no link between the corporal and spiritual self. They are in harmony like musicians in an orchestra — of course, God is the chef d’orchestre. But we are not God’s marionettes: Leibniz also has a (strange ad hoc) way of salvaging free will. In a few words, we choose what we are supposed to choose considering the context and information that we have (both of which are pre-programmed). That’s not really free free will, at least not arbitrary free will. But anyway, that leads us the Leibniz’s (Leibniz’?) answers to Descartes**.

Against point #1: Then why can’t I fine-tune every movement? Suppose I want to throw a stone at exactly ten yards. Why can’t I? Some people (like athletes, surgeons and dancers) can actually pull up that kind of stunts, but only after countless hours of training… their body.

Against point #2: That’s a unfounded hypothesis. Cartesians can not account for the union of the body and soul.

Against point #3: Then why are there perceptions that are felt by the body but never reach the soul? Leibniz gives the example of a man that is sleeping and is poked with a needle. He might change position, make a few grunting noises, but he will not have the idea “I am being poked with a needle”.

We already know that the cartesian view of the mind is currently not doing so well in the scientific community, despite strange attempts to reintroduce it using quantum-physics-saves-the-day type of argumentation. But studying Leibniz makes you realize that Descartes was already being refuted in his own era, and start to wonder why his model got so popular in the first place.

Of course, the leibnizian view is not really better, but at least nobody still believes that.

*If you haven’t read Damasio’s excellent book, there’s a summary written by Dan Dennet.

** Everything here comes from the letter to Arnauld of october 1687.